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ABSTRACT
OOL
The basic principle ofManeuver Warfare in the 21 st century is the
seamless integration of sea and land as maneuver space. Unfortunately, our inability to
conduct counter-mine and counter-obstacle operations in the littorals severely curtails our
ability to conduct Amphibious Warfare, a key ingredient to maneuver. Hydra-7, a
possible solution to this problem is one of the most promising counter-mine weapons
under development, but its final performance level will depend on the effectiveness of
sub-component technologies. These sub-component technologies have yet to reach
maturity and may not perform as well as desired. This thesis provides analysis
procedures and models to predict Hydra-7 effectiveness for a broad range ofpossible
performance values ofsub-component systems. The methodology will determine which
of the sub-component technologies is most critical to the final performance ofHydra-7.
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DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic errors,
they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without
additional verification is at the risk ofthe planner.
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS AND VARIABLES
The Hydra-7, in its current form, consists of three parts, the impactor (I), the
munition (M), and the system (S). The impactor kills the target, the munition, which is
guided, delivers several hundred impactors to the objective, and the system is a group of
munitions banded together and strapped to an aircraft. See Figures (1) and (2).
A Area (ft2)
R Radius(ft)
Pk Probability of kill
Ph Probability of hit * Note-only used when Pk < 1.0.
N Number of impactors
M Number of munitions
D Distribution
C Coverage of area
Z Number of sorties
X Number of systems per sortie
s Number of systems
Variables specific to an application or equation will be introduced as needed.
Capital letters are used to better facilitate the use of subscripts for identification purposes.
For example, Rmunition is the radius of a munition, while Rmine is the radius ofa mine.
xv
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The basic principle ofManeuver Warfare in the 21 st century is the seamless
integration of sea and land as maneuver space. Unfortunately, our inability to conduct
counter-mine and counter-obstacle operations in the littorals severely curtails our ability
to conduct Amphibious Warfare, a key ingredient to maneuver.
Hydra-7, a possible solution to this problem, is one ofthe most promising
counter-mine weapons under development. The mine clearance methodology ofthe
Hydra-7 is to saturate the area to be cleared with high speed incendiary darts. However,
its final performance level will depend on the effectiveness of sub-component
technologies. These sub-component technologies have yet to reach maturity and may not
perform as well as desired.
Analysis to predict Hydra-7 effectiveness for a broad range of possible
performance values of sub-component systems was conducted. The results of the
analysis helped to determine which ofthe sub-component technologies is most critical to
the final performance ofHydra-7. Additionally, the results provided a range of system
performance characteristics that will assist in the development of a Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) governing future Amphibious Warfare.
Analysis was conducted on the output from a simulation in which Hydra-7's with
a base case set of sub-component characteristics were employed against a simulated
minefield. Performance characteristics of each sub-component ofthe Hydra-7 were
modified between each simulation, and the results were compared to the base case.
Changes in battlefield conditions were applied, and the simulations were repeated. Output
was in the form of the total probability of killing a mine located anywhere in the
minefield. The number of Hydra-7' s required to achieve a specific probability of kill was
calculated, and the associated number of aircraft sorties was determined.
xvn
Table (1) below shows the number of sorties required to clear a single 240 ft. by
240 ft. Initial Craft Landing Site (ICLS) of six inch mines. Other sub-component
characteristics include the number of darts per Hydra-7 (6545), accuracy ofthe guidance
system (7 meters), and the number ofHydra-7 systems carried on each sortie (10).












Further analysis revealed the following:
(1) Halving the mine radius quadruples the required number of sorties.
(2) Halving the number of darts contained in a Hydra-7 munition doubles
the required number of sorties.
(3) If the Hydra-7' s are built so that the darts cover as large an area as
possible, the effect of inaccuracies in guidance technology are
rninimized.
(4) Total probabilities of kill of greater than .98 are very expensive in
terms of sorties, and are probably unreasonable.
The size ofthe targeted mine is the single most important battlefield condition in
determining the number of sorties required. Killing mines that are less than four inches
in diameter is very difficult with a dart, and is probably unreasonable. It is unlikely that
the Hydra-7, whatever its final form, will be an effective solution to anti-personnel mines.
However, its potential against anti-tank mines, which are generally larger than four
inches in radius, appears to be good.
The most important sub-component characteristic is the performance ofthe dart
dispensing system. The larger the pattern that the impacting darts make on the ground,
the more flexible the weapon will be. Spreading the darts out over a larger area reduces
the mine killing effectiveness within the pattern. However, this reduction can be
overcome by overlapping impact areas. On the other hand, a small impact pattern with
many darts has a good chance of killing mines within it. But, it is less resilient to
xvin
guidance system inaccuracies. Engineers face the problem of evenly dispensing the darts
over a large area while maintaining the dart velocity necessary to kill mines. This will not
be an easy problem to solve, and is the single most critical design characteristic.
The Hydra-7 still has many engineering and design obstacles to overcome.
However, over the range of variables studied in this analysis, its ability to perform is not
tied to any single battlefield condition. Additionally, a functional Hydra-7 has
employment possibilities as a breaching weapon in a conventional breach, it adds
minimal logistic footprint, it can be carried organically within deployed units, and it can
be employed with a high degree of pilot survivability directly in advance of assaulting
troops.
In summary, there is no compelling reason not to pursue the Hydra-7. Ifthe
engineering and design problems are solved successfully, it should prove to be a
powerful, flexible, and useful weapon.
xix
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. .the very shallow water region is a critical pointfor our offensive
forces, and can easily, quickly, and cheaply be exploited by the enemy.
MajGen Edward J. Hanlon Jr., Directory of
Expeditionary Warfare, Sea Power, May
1997.
A. BACKGROUND
The "Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power
Projection" provides a framework for the execution ofmine countermeasures (MCM) in
support of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) in the time frame 2010 to 2015
[Ref. 1], The basic principle of maneuver in the 21 st century is the seamless integration of
sea and land for use as maneuver space. Rather than phasing ashore, building up combat
power, and then moving inland, the battlespace ofthe future envisions maneuver directly
from the ship to the objective. The success ofthese operations will hinge on dominance of
the battlespace and unencumbered movement in the air, on land, and at sea.
Currently, Joint and Naval forces are trained and equipped to gain and maintain
freedom of maneuver on land, in the air, and in the open ocean. The ability to establish
unencumbered maneuver when operating in the littorals, however, is severely limited.
Already characterized by narrowness and limited maneuverability, the mining of littoral
areas can literally paralyze unequipped operating forces. By the very nature ofthe
mission, de-mining and breaching operations, even those involving forces both trained and
equipped, are extremely hazardous.
Without question, the preferred method for dealing with the littoral threat is
prevention. If intelligence gathering assets can determine a hostile nation's intent to mine,
steps can be taken to prevent their doing so. Despite the attraction of this technique, the
reality is that political restraints placed on the military leadership will often eliminate
this option.
Ifprevention is unsuccessful, avoidance is preferred. Ifthe minefield can be
bypassed, it should be. This is true when conducting operations both on land and at sea.
The Marine Corps' doctrine ofManeuver Warfare teaches leaders to avoid assaulting an
enemy's strength whenever possible [Ref. 2]. A leader should always attempt to gain
positional advantage through maneuver, and then attack the enemy where he is weakest.
While this is certainly good advice, only the foolish leader fails to maintain the ability to
conduct the frontal attack when necessary. In the way that a football team must establish a
good ground game in order to have a truly effective passing attack, the attacker must have
the ability to conduct an effective frontal attack in order to force the defender to establish
a front. Once the defender establishes a front, the attacker has the ability to maneuver to a
position of advantage. Without the threat of a frontal attack, defender can choose to
defend with equal, if somewhat degraded strength, in all directions. This leaves the
attacker with only one option, a frontal attack, which he is ill-equipped to conduct. This
philosophy is equally true at sea, particularly in the restrictive maneuver space of the
littorals, and should convince us that, although unattractive, the ability to conduct an
opposed minefield breach is an absolute necessity.
Once begun, a breaching operation must be conducted rapidly, and without
hesitation. Clearly then, a true littoral MCM capability includes an in-stride minefield
breaching capability. This implies the integration of systems which are rapidly
employable and deployable. They must be more accurate and effective than anything in
the inventory thus far, and they must be available in a reasonable amount oftime [Ref. 3].
Breaching of minefields in the littorals can realistically be broken down into two
areas: chokepoint transits and ship-to-objective maneuver. While identification,
classification, and neutralization ofmines during chokepoint transit are currently
substandard, the capability to conduct these operations does exist. Additionally,
appropriate technologies and advancements in this type of operation appear to be on
course, and the MCM community has confidence that this requirement will be met with
satisfaction by the year 2015 [Ref. 3].
On the other hand, obstacle and mine identification, classification, and
neutralization in support of ship-to-objective maneuver requires significant improvement.
In general, the surface transited during Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM) can be
broken down into five areas: over the horizon (deep water), from just under the horizon to
the forty foot depth (shallow water), from forty feet to ten feet (very shallow water, or
VSW), from ten feet to the beach (surfzone or SZ), and on the beach itself (beach zone or
BZ). Currently the U.S. does possess some breaching capability in both the deep and
shallow water zones. However, recent wargames indicate that the VSW, SZ, and BZ
regions lack a clearance capability, and future capabilities are contingent on unproven
technologies. [Ref. 3 and 4]
B. FILLING THE VOID
In order to establish true battlespace dominance, the capability void that currently
exists in breaching must be filled. New systems and technologies must be designed, and
tactics must be developed which will provide operating forces with a true maneuver
capability. This ability will complete the battlespace dominance triad, which will in turn
facilitate the execution of maneuver in keeping with the concepts ofOMFTS.
1. Current Systems
Currently, the two systems which are expected to perform the majority ofBZ
clearance are ground operated. These systems, the 'Tower Blade" and the "Grizzly" are
based on current land mine clearance techniques, which requires that they be on the beach
in order to use a mine clearance blade [Ref. 5]. This method of land mine clearance is
common today, and will likely still be in use in the future. Unfortunately, the transition of
these vehicles ashore requires a cleared landing site. Without this Initial Craft Landing
Site (ICLS), these two systems can not be offloaded to clear the remainder of the BZ.
One current method of clearing the ICLS is through conventional bombing.
However, this method is so destructive to the beach and the ICLS that it is counter-
productive, and often renders the beach useless as a landing site. Future technologies may
include the use of guidance technology with conventional warheads to increase accuracy
and minimize damage to the ICLS. While this idea has potential for use in obstacle
clearance, it is not envisioned as a counter mine capability. Other counter mine systems,
both those that exist and those that are in the development stages, are geared towards mine
clearance in water (SZ, VSW, SW), not for clearance on land. The MCM CONTECH '00
War Game Book, [Ref. 5] provides a listing of all unclassified current and future counter
mine and counter obstacle systems. With the exception ofthe Hydra-7, none listed is
designed to clear mines on land from a platform located at sea or in the air.
2. The Hydra-7 Mine/Countermine System
The Hydra-7 system, which is currently being designed for mine destruction on
the beach, looks particularly capable. A "plug and play" weapon designed with
interchangeable warheads capable of a variety of missions, it may have the flexibility to
perform many tasks with a simple modification. An additional attractive feature ofthe
Hydra-7 is the claim that it can be fired from any platform capable of dropping a Mk82
five hundred pound bomb. It may also eliminate many concerns of deployability due to
the claim that it is reasonably small. Equivalent to the Mk82 in size and weight, addition
ofthe Hydra-7 could result in no increase in total logistical footprint ifMk82's are
replaced by Hydra-7' s on a one to one basis. [Ref. 6]
Although not yet operational, and based on new principles ofemployment
utilizing Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, it has repeatedly received very
high acclaim from participants ofwargames for its advertised employability,
deployability, and survivability [Ref. 3]. Unfortunately, it is still in the very early stages
of development, and its true effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated. Ifthe Hydra-7 turns
out to be as effective as advertised in breaching mines in the BZ, it will significantly
enhance the overall breaching effort. Additionally, it may prove to be a valuable asset
against other targets, to include obstacles and mines in the SZ. However, if for some
reason it fails against mines in the BZ, then the combat capability void extends inland to
the high water mark, and this future capability void must be exposed now.
For the purposes of this paper, one Hydra-7 system is composed oftwo major
components, munitions and impactors. The other components which make up the Hydra-7
are not important to this discussion. Shown in Figure (1), each munition contains between
500 and 950 impactors, and each system is comprised of between five and seven
munitions. Initially, the system is dropped from a ground attack jet without guidance.
However, once released, the band holding the munitions together detaches, and each
munition is independently guided to the target. As depicted in Figure (2), each munition
approaches a pre-determined terminal velocity and altitude, and the impactors are
dispensed, saturating the target area and killing mines through a combination of kinetic
energy and chemical reaction. While the concept is fairly simple, the actual result on the
ground is the result of some unknown distribution of munitions, each with an unknown
distribution of impactors. [Ref. 6]
Also, the Hydra-7 must possess the characteristics which facilitate its employment
as part of a combined arms team. Simultaneous employment of other weapons must not
interfere with its performance.
HYDRA-7 CONCEPT












HIGH TEMPERATURE INCENDIARY DART
Figure 1: Hydra-7 Components
The Impactor (bottom): Kills the mine through kinetic and chemical energy interaction.
The Munition (middle): Guides, accelerates, and dispenses impactors to objective.
































Figure 2: Hydra-7 Concept of Employment
Aircraft releases Hydra-7 systems, systems release munitions, munitions guide to target
area, accelerate, and dispense impactors, impactors kill targets.
(Figures (1) and (2) provided by Lockheed Martin)
C. REQUIREMENTS
An analysis of the potential ofany system would be incomplete if it did not begin
with a clear understanding ofthe mission for which the system was being designed, and
the requirements associated with the performance of that mission. The Hydra-7's initial
design, should it work, is most suited for the clearance ofthe ICLS from a standoff
distance. This mission is identified as the most significant required capability ofthe mid-
term (FY09-FY14), and the requirements are summarized as follows [Ref. 7]:
1) The system must not use more than 10% of the Amphibious Task Force
organic fixed wing Air Tasking Order (ATO) D-Day sortie rate, 20% threshold
(upper bound).
2) The system must have the ability to clear up to 12 ICLS simultaneously within
ten minutes of the launch ofthe first munition, 20 minutes threshold.
3) The system must be delivered from standoff distance, outside the range of
enemy direct fire weapons.
4) Although not a specific requirement, the ability to conduct clearance of craft
landing sites (CLS) in support of follow-on forces is desirable quality.
This analysis ofthe Hydra-7 weapon system will carefully evaluate its potential
ability to meet the first requirement. The measure of effectiveness is the number of sorties
required to achieve the desired probability of kill against a mine with radius Rmi„e .
II. SORTIE REQUIREMENT MODELS
A. METHODOLOGY
The first step in conducting this analysis is to design a perfectly efficient weapon,
one for which every munition and every impactor lands exactly where intended. Next, the
number of sorties required (Z) to clear an area the size ofan ICLS will be determined.
Subsequently this weapon will experience a series ofcompounding imperfections, starting
with an inability to perfectly distribute the impactors within the munition, and eventually
leading to cases where errors exist in the munition impact points. As weapon performance
deteriorates, analytical solutions will no longer be possible, and simulation will
be introduced.
B. THE PERFECT WEAPON
The most efficient, or perfect weapon, uses the fewest possible impactors to
achieve Pktotai against a mine with radius Rmine in area A totai- The minimum number of
impactors is achieved when the impactors are placed as far apart as possible, but still
guarantee a kill. This occurs when the impact points are placed on the vertices of
equilateral triangles, as shown in Figures (3) and (4). Despite the fact that it is extremely
difficult to achieve the perfect weapon, these calculations are important because they give
an indication ofwhether or not the weapon should be pursued. The perfect weapon
provides an upper bound on system effectiveness, and if it requires an inordinate number
of sorties, then further development ofthe Hydra-7 system may be unwise.
1. Circle Packing
The mine killing geometry is more easily visualized if the roles ofthe impactor
and the mine are reversed. The number of circles of radius Rmi„e required to completely
cover an area A is the same as the number of impactors required to cover A such that no
mine of radius Rmine can survive. Deterrnining the distance (d) between impactors which
ensures contact with a mine ofradius Rmj„e , but which maximizes the distance between
impactors is accomplished through the application of circle packing problem techniques
outlined by Washburn [Ref. 8: Ch. l,p. 3].
Referring to Figures (3) and (4), the fraction ofthe entire area A covered by the
circles is equal to the fraction ofthe repeating equilateral triangle which is covered
{Ctnangie)- In this analysis, edge effects occurring at the boundary ofA are ignored.
Figure (3) shows the case where Ctnangie =1.0 (complete coverage), and Figure (4) the case
where C'triangle = .9069. The distance between the centers ofthe circles (d) can be
controlled through choice ofthe angle 9. [Ref. 8: Ch. 1, p. 4]
In particular, d is given by,
d = 2Rmmecos(9). (1)
When 0=0 (no circle overlap), Ctotai = .9069, and when 9 = tt/6, then Ctotai ~ 1.0
(complete coverage). Equation 1.2-1 from Reference (8) provides Equation (2).
ForO<0<7r/6,,wu
>
% + 3(cos9 sin 9-9)
C,owl =
" VW# ' (2)
Given Ctotai, 9 can be determined from Equation (2). See Table (1).
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Table 1. Values of 6 for Given Ctotai's
The area ofeach ofthe repeating triangles shown in Figures (3) and (4) is
Ka*. = ^RLe COS
2
0. (3)
Because each triangle covers 1/6 of three different circles, there are twice as many
triangles as circles [Ref. 8: Ch. l,p. 4]. Therefore, the number of impactors required to
cover area A to a level ofCtotai is
N = A
2y[3R 2 cos2 6 (4)




In the case ofthe absolutely perfect weapon, where every mine with radius Rmine













Because the number ofrequired impactors is inversely proportional to the square
ofRmi„e, killing smaller and smaller mines becomes increasingly difficult with this
weapon.
2. Solve for Sorties
Once Nmai is known, and given the number of impactors per munition (N), the
total number of munitions (m) is
Then given the number of munitions per Hydra-7 (M), the total number ofHydra-
7's (5) can be found. The total number of sorties (Z) is then obtained by dividing S by the








3. Solution 1: The Perfect Weapon
To solve for the number of sorties required under perfect conditions, some
assumptions about the values of variables must be made.
N (Impactors per munition) = 935,
X(Hydra-7's per Sortie) = 10,
M (Munitions per Hydra-7) = 7,
Rmine (Mine radius) = .5ft,
Pktotai (the total probability of killing Rmj„e) = 1.0,
#(from Table (1)) = n/6, and
A (The area to be cleared) = (240 ft) (240 ft) = 57600 ft2









Z = 1.3 5 sorties.
V
^
munitions' Hvdra j \^^Hydrasteortie )
This is a relatively small number of sorties. From these computations, it appears
that a perfect Hydra-7 weapon, where every impactor hits exactly where it is aimed, is a
viable weapon. Of course, this level of accuracy is unrealistic, and degradation in system
performance must be evaluated.
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4. Solution 2: The Perfect Weapon Employed Imperfectly
If it were the case that a Pktotai of .95 was sufficient, then the required number of
sorties would decrease. Because impactors kill mines with a probability of 1 .0, Ctotai =
Pktotai, and Table (1) shows that the appropriate value for #is rc/12. Equation (5) is then














l -'-'•'impactors/ munition J
( , V
7
i munitions/ Hydra J\ * ^Hydras/sortie ^
= 1.09 sorties.
As expected, the reduction of Pktotai from 1.0 to .95 results in a lower sortie requirement.
C. A CONFETTI APPROXIMATION
Another scenario which can be modeled is the assumption that all ofthe
impactors are uniformly and independently distributed over^4 /oto/ [Ref. 9]. This situation
is well modeled by the Confetti Approximation.
1. Description
The Confetti Approximation (CA) calculates the probability of covering a point
target located in an area^ toto/ by N disks which are "cut up" into n small pieces, each of
which is uniformly and independently "thrown" onto A totai- The total area covered by the
N disks (Am disks) is the area of each disk (Adisk) times N.
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Using the CA,
P{Covering a point target with one piece of confetti } =
UAotal
P{Missing with one piece of confetti} = 1 - '
nAotal






\ Aou,, j ^ n become large.








Solving for the total number of impactors yields





Note that as was the case for the perfect weapon, the required number of
impactors is inversely proportional to the square ofRmi„e .
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2. Solution 3: Confetti Approximation
Using the same values for the variables as in Solution 2, the CA and perfect
weapon approximations can be compared.
JV(Impactors per munition) = 935,
X(Hydra-7's per Sortie) = 10,
M (Munitions per Hydra-7) = 7,
Rmine (Mine radius) = .5ft,
Pktotai (the total probability of killing Rmine) = .95,














i munitions/ Hydra > ^ ^Hydras/sortie J
= 3.35 sorties.
As shown in Solution 2, a 95% clearance level costs approximately 1 .09 sorties
when a perfectly built munition is used. Solution 3 indicates that the 3.35 sorties are
required when Confetti Approximation is used. This is not an excessive number of sorties
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for the proposed mission. So, it appears that the Hydra-7 remains a viable weapon for this
mission even when the impactor guidance accuracy degrades to the point where all
impactors are uniformly and independently scattered over the ICLS. But for smaller mines
or large Pkt0tai's, the required number of sorties can dramatically increase.
It would be convenient to assume that the CA provides an upper bound for Z for a
realistic Hydra-7 weapon system. However, the assumption that the impactors can be
delivered uniformly and independently within A possibly makes the CA optimistic. In
reality, impactors will be distributed as part of a set ofNimpaaurs/mumtlon , and will therefore
not be independent. As will be shown, this restriction on their placement will tend to
increase the required number of sorties. The distribution of the impactors within the
munition footprint, and the subsequent packing of the munitions within the ICLS can
significantly degrade the performance of the Hydra-7 system. Simulation modeling will
be required to quantify this change.
D. A UNIFORM APPROXIMATION
It is also noted that the Confetti Approximation is not the only analytical model
which can be used to estimate Pktota i when the impactors are independently and uniformly















v total j (13)
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This is approximately the CA result in Equation (12) when Ad,Sk/A totai is small.
Although slightly more difficult conceptually, the CA proved to be more useful in the
results verification phase (Chapter III) ofthe study.
E. BUILDING PERFECT MUNITIONS
The above situation assumed that all ofthe impactors would be delivered
independently, as ifthere was only one very large munition capable of carrying unlimited
impactors. The truth is that impactors will be delivered to A in sets of size N, where each
set is a munition. Also, it is unclear what final shape, or footprint, those N impactors will
create when they impact on the ground. For the purposes ofthis study, the distribution of
the impactors contained in a single muntion on the ground will be referred to as Dmuniti0n .
The actual value ofN is also not known because the impactor dispensing system
is still under development, and it is unclear how much space it will occupy within the
encased munition. Without a dispensing system, the maximum number of impactors that
will fit into the munition is 935. The final number will be smaller because the dispensing
system is expected to be located within the munition itself, and will therefore reduce the
space available for impactors. [Ref. 6]
Evaluation will assume that the footprint is circular, and that each impactor is
perfectly placed within the circle (perfect Dmunition)- This result will be compared to the
munition whose impactors are uniformly distributed within the circle (uniform Dmw,mon)'
Once the circular munitions are built, they must be packed into A
.
The perfect munition is built utilizing the circle packing techniques introduced in
Chapter II, Section B. The impactors will be placed on the vertices ofhexagons and
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packed in a honeycomb fashion. Although the munition is referred to as perfect, there is
no requirement for Pkmimition to be 1 .0. In this case, perfect refers to the ability to
individually place each impactor within the munition footprint. The choice oiPkmunitlon
will determine d, the distance between impactors, which in turn will determine Rmumtton-
1. Finding Rmumtion for PkmunMon less than .9069, Perfect DmunMon
For PkmunitionS of less than .9069, which occur when the edges ofthe circles do












2. Finding RmunMon for PkmunMon of .9069 or Greater, Perfect DmunMon
a. FindRhex
For Pkmunition 's of .9069 to 1.0, Equation (1) can be used to determine the
distance between impactors (d) required to attain the desired Pktotai. The appropriate value
for #is taken from Table (1). Rhex, the radius ofthe hexagon, is found, and then converted
10 K-mumtion-
From Equation ( 1 ),
d = 2Rmme cos<9in
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Rhex is determined by multiplying the number of impactors on the radius
of the hexagon (n) by d, the distance between them. It is not difficult to solve for the
following relationship between N, the total number of impactors in the hexagon, and n, the










The following simple example helps to clarify this relationship.
N = total number of impactors
= 37
n = number of impactors on radius
I*
L 3 4j 2
= 4
Figure 5: The Perfect Hexagon
R^x can now be found as,
b.
Rhex=(n-l)d
Find the Area ofthe Hexagon (Ahex)
(16)
The area of a hexagon (Aha) can be calculated by determining the area of
one of the component equilateral triangles {A triangie) (see Figure 5) and multiplying by six.
Each triangle can be broken into two right triangles with area Art.
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Solving for h, the height ofthe right triangle,






Art - Z "hex"'
triangle
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c Convert the Hexagon to a Circle
The basis ofthe conversion is the assumption that a munition with a
circular footprint will cover the same area as a munition with a hexagonal one. Given this
assumption, Rank can be found as follows.
Assumption: A hex - A circie-
From Equation (18):
2.5981/? hex=Acircle,
2.598 1 Khex = TtR* circle-,
R* circle = .827001 Khex,
Rarcle = .909395 Rhex . (19)
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d. Finding Total Munitions Required
Once d is known, the number of munition circles required to cover area A
is the product of the number of munitions on each axis. This is the likely manner in which
the munitions will be employed. The decision is to place the munitions as shown in
Figure (6), with the center ofthe bottom row of munitions on the line that represents the
lower limit ofA. This decision is based on the fact that the lower end ofA is closest to the
beach, and therefore each point on it has a high probability of being crossed by assaulting
troops. The left edge ofA, chosen arbitrarily, will intersect the centers of every other row
of munitions.
Figure 6: Munition Aiming Points
Each munition is expected to be individually and independently guided,
and will require a set of coordinates to be input prior to launch. The distance between any
two centers is d, so the change in X direction is just d, and the change in Y direction is
cos(n/6)d.
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Let the length ofthe X axis ofA be Ax . Likewise, let the length of the Y












When the conditions are such that Pkmunition is equal to the required Pktotau
Pktotai is achieved when A is completely covered with munitions, and Equation (1) can be
used to find d. However, it is not very accurate, because it does not account for the
increase in Pktotai which results from munition overlap. Calculating the Pkmai which
results from the overlap ofmany PkmunitionS is difficult. Finding the proper distance
between the centers of imperfect circles which results in a desired Pkmai is equally
difficult, but will be approached through simulation. However, Equation (1) does provide
a d that guarantees Pktotai at a minimum, and will therefore suffice for the time being.
3. Solution 4: Munitions With Perfect Impactor Distribution
The same values for the variables are used as in Solution's 2 and 3. The new
variables introduced for this problem are Pkmuniti0n and Dmunition (the distribution of the
impactors within the munition footprint). Fot this study, Dmunitwn can only be one of two
things, perfect or uniform. The actual distribution is still unknown, and could vary greatly
from these two possibilities.
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^munition ~~ perfect
Pkmunition = 95, SO 0= 7C/12
N (Impactors per munition) = 935,
X(Hydra-7's per Sortie) = 10,
M (Munitions per Hydra-7) = 7,
Rmine (Mine radius) = .5ft,
Photai (the total probability of killing Rmme) = .95.
Step (1): Building the munitions.
From Equation (1) and Table (1),






From Equation ( 1 6),




+ — = 18.15 impactors.
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Step (2): Packing the munitions.
From Equation ( 1 ) and Table ( 1 ) for 100% Coverage,
^benveenmunrtions =2^^CO^ j= 27.61 feet.
From Equations (22) through (24),
240M =^- + 1 = 9.69,
x
27.61
M = 24° +1 = 11.04,
y
.866(</)
M***/ =MxMy = 106.98 = 107 munitions.




= 1 -53 sorties.
munitions'' Hydra Hydras/sortie
This result compares well to Solution (2), in which it cost 1.09 sorties to get 95%
clearance when impactors were perfectly placed over A. Although delivering the
impactors in perfectly built Hydra-7 munition circles did increase the sortie requirement,
1 .53 sorties appears to be acceptable, and the Hydra-7 remains a viable weapon.
F. BUILDING IMPERFECT MUNITIONS
1. Uniform Impactor Distribution
Here the assumption is made that the distribution ofthe impactors within the
footprint of the munition is uniform. Control over Pkmunuion is maintained by choice of
^munition- Ifthe system design allows control of the radius ofthe munition, then the user
may define the level of clearance that is appropriate, and therefore determine the required
number of sorties. Once d, Pkmunitlon and Rmumtion are defined, the total number of
munitions required can be found as described above. How the munitions are built,
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whether perfectly or uniformly, does not affect the technique used for packing the
munitions within A.
Let Pkoniyi be the probability that one impactor, uniformly distributed over a disk
with area A, hits a mine with radius R. Let Pkatieasti be the probability that at least one out

























„ )V munition /
(24)
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2. Solution 5: Munitions With Uniform Impactor Distribution
Denton = uniform
Pktotal ~ -95.
Pkmunition = -95, so 6= n/6* (Cover 100% of A)
N (Impactors per munition) = 935,
X (Hydra-7's per Sortie) = 10,
M (Munitions per Hydra-7) = 7,
Rmme (Mine radius) = .5ft,
A totai= (240ft) (240ft) = 57600 ft
2
Once again, the actual Pktotai would be greater than .95 because ofthe overlap
caused when circles are packed to completely cover a plane. See Figure (3).
Step (1): Building the munition.
From Equation (24),
*_ = 7 ~ w = 8-84 feet.
[l-(l-.95)'-J
2
Step (2): Packing the munitions.
From Table (1), when C = 1.0, 9= tt/6.
* Equation (1) is still accurate when finding the distance between impactors within the munition
footprint because the impactor Pk is 1.0.
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d =2R cos^/ =15 31 feet
" between munitions ^^munition ^UZi /ft
l J"J 1 1CCU
Consolidating the steps shown in Solution (4) above,
M
totai 1 318.52 A ccZ = ^ = = 4.55 sorties.
7 10 70
munitions/Hydra Hydras/sortie
So, if the impactors are uniformly distributed over the munition footprint, rather
than over A totai, the number of sorties increases from 3.35 to 4.53, which may still be an
operationally reasonable number. Note, however, that the placement ofthe munitions
within Atotai has been perfect throughout the analysis.
G. INTRODUCTION OF FIRING ERRORS
Up to this point, each munition has been perfectly placed within A. This
assumption has allowed the use of circle packing methods for determining the number of
sorties required. However, it is an incorrect assumption. Due to the nature of air
delivered ordnance, each independently guided munition will experience some error
in accuracy.
1. Types of Error
Bias error results in a fixed error among all rounds fired at the target. Usually
assumed to be caused by the "sights" or by the "shooter", error that is a result of a bias can
result in a "tight group", the center ofwhich is offofthe intended target [Ref. 9]. In this
analysis, the Hydra-7 saturates all of area A with impactors. Therefore, bias errors do not
affect the clearance level within area A, they only affect the final location of it. Based on
the assumption that assaulting forces will know the final location ofA, and that they will
use it as the Initial Craft Landing Site, bias errors are ignored in this study.
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Dispersion error, or the error associated with the point of impact relative to the
point ofaim, is a "collection of independent random variables" [Ref. 9]. It will account
for the majority ofthe degradation in weapon system efficiency. In the case of Hydra-7,
the independent variables which together form the dispersion error can be reduced to
global positioning system (GPS) error, guidance system error and flight error.
GPS error is likely to be the most significant, and therefore the most important, of
the causes of dispersion error. While some of the causes ofGPS inaccuracies may be
eliminated or reduced in the future, there is no guarantee of this. To be complete, this
study will assume that GPS error will be from to 24 feet.
Guidance system error would be caused by failures in the inverse guidance law,
which was developed and is currently undergoing testing by Lockheed Martin. Any errors
found in this new guidance concept will manifest themselves in the form of dispersion
errors, and will be a part ofthe final overall dispersion error tally.
Finally, even if the GPS transmitter and guidance technology perform perfectly,
each munition is subject to error during flight. This will also increase the total
dispersion error.
2. Effects of Dispersion Error
Dispersion error will be a combination ofthe above, and will be accounted for in
the form of Circular Error Probable, or CEP, which is defined as the radius ofthe circle
which contains halfofthe shots [Ref. 10]. The use ofCEP vice standard deviation (a) is
common in firing theory. As shown below, assuming normally distributed dispersion
errors, the two are closely related.
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-CEP2










The introduction ofCEP complicates the determination of the number of sorties
required to achieve the required Pktotai. While the calculations for Rmmition remain the
same, the method for determining the d, the distance between munition centers (Equation
(1)) is no longer applicable.
The circle packing techniques introduced in Chapter n, Section B are valid for
munition building because the Pk for each impactor is 1 .0, but they have limited
application in the employment of munitions whose Pkmimition is less than 1.0.. This is
because Equations (1) and (4) do not account for the increase in Pktotai that results from
overlapping munitions.
Derivation of a method which yields an analytical solution is difficult, and will
not be addressed here. Analytical results would be of limited use anyway, because the
actual final position ofeach munition will be normally distributed about its point ofaim.
Point estimates make poor predictors ofrandom CEP's. However, accurate
approximations ofthe Pktotai achieved through combinations ofRmunmon, PkmUnition, and
dbetween munitions can be found through simulation. The results of the simulation can then be
used to dictate the appropriate positioning of munitions required to achieve Pktotai.
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H. SOLVING FOR PKtotal THROUGH SIMULATION
The simulation independent variables are the ratio ofRmUmtion to dbetween munitions
{RoverD), Pkmunition , and ratio ofCEP to dbetween munitions {CEPoverD). The use of unitless
variables allows saving the simulation output in 2-dimensional matrices. The simulation
is conducted using MATLAB [Ref. 10].




2. Assuming d=l, determine munition aimpoints. Using independent, normal x-
and y- errors determined from the specified CEP value, compute random
munition impact points.
3. Specify RoverD.
4. Uniformly distribute 100 target mines over the ICLS.
5. Specify Pkmun ition and determine an average Pk
.
6. Repeat steps 3. through 5. for all values ofRoverD and Pkmuniti0n . Call the
matrix of averages "Phatch "
7. Repeat steps 2. through 6. 50 times. The final matrix, called "P^oto/ ", is the
average of the 50 Phatch values.
This procedure will give a Pktotai value ofeach {RoverD, CEPoverD, Pkmunition)
triplet. Table (2) shows simulation output for CEPoverD of 0.
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1. Solution 6: Use of Simulation Results
The simulation is used to find d^etween munitions- Otherwise, the problem solving




» ^munition ~ •*»»
N (Impactors per munition) = 935,
X(Hydra-7's per Sortie) = 10,
M (Munitions per Hydra-7) = 7,
Rmim (Mine radius) = .5ft,
Atotai= (240ft) (240ft) = 57 600 ft
2
Step (1): Building the munitions.
Because Dmuniti0n is uniform,





Step (2): Packing the munitions.
The row from Table (2) which intersects with the column labeled





d = "munition = }±^_ = j 5 Q6
RoverD .8
The sortie requirement can be found as follows:






+ 1 =^ = 19.4,
13.04
'J








This is a representative example, demonstrating the use of the simulation output
to get dbetween munitions when CEP is zero. Ifthe results are accurate, then the correct
dbetween munition can be obtained for any combinations of input parameters.
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RoverD Pk(mun)=0.5 Pk(mun)=0.6 Pk(mun)=0.7 Pk(mun)=0.8 Pk(mun)=0.9 Pk(mun)=1.0
0.5000 0.4516 0.5419 0.6322 0.7226 0.8129 0.9032
0.5500 0.5217 0.6196 0.7155 0.8092 0.9009 0.9904
0.6000 0.5757 0.6726 0.7634 0.8482 0.9271 1.0000
0.6500 0.6242 0.7178 0.8018 0.8765 0.9425 1.0000
0.7000 0.6730 0.7624 0.8388 0.9033 0.9567 1.0000
0.7500 0.7187 0.8030 0.8716 0.9261 0.9683 1.0000
0.8000 0.7695 0.8473 0.9064 0.9496 0.9798 1.0000
0.8500 0.8168 0.8870 0.9362 0.9686 0.9885 1.0000
0.9000 0.8546 0.9175 0.9582 0.9819 0.9942 1.0000
0.9500 0.8861 0.9410 0.9736 0.9906 0.9977 1.0000
1.0000 0.9132 0.9594 0.9844 0.9958 0.9995 1.0000
1.0500 0.9312 0.9699 0.9894 0.9975 0.9997 1.0000
1.1000 0.9462 0.9781 0.9930 0.9985 0.9999 1.0000
1.1500 0.9558 0.9830 0.9949 0.9990 0.9999 1.0000
1.2000 0.9664 0.9879 0.9966 0.9994 1.0000 1.0000
1.2500 0.9750 0.9917 0.9979 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000
1.3000 0.9824 0.9948 0.9989 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000
1.3500 0.9882 0.9970 0.9995 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000
1.4000 0.9912 0.9979 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.4500 0.9934 0.9985 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.5000 0.9953 0.9991 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.5500 0.9966 0.9994 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.6000 0.9976 0.9996 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.6500 0.9983 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.7000 0.9988 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.7500 0.9993 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.8000 0.9996 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.8500 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.9000 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.9500 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Table 2. CEP =
Pktotai as a function ofRoverD and Pkmunition
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III. VERIFICATION OF RESULTS
Before the results ofthe simulation are put to use, it is necessary to establish some
confidence in their accuracy. Although it is nearly impossible to establish absolute
accuracy for most of the simulation results, it is possible to use known analytical solutions
to paint a picture ofwhat accurate simulations should look like.
A. ANALYTICAL VERIFICATION
A good first step in establishing simulation accuracy is to compare the results
found using the simulation to those that can be found analytically. Analytical solutions are
possible in a few limited cases. Ifthe analytical solutions are not captured within a
reasonable simulation-produced confidence interval, then the simulation results
are questionable.
1. Explanation
The probability of kill (Pk) for a batch is the average of the probability of kill for
each ofthe 100 independent and identically distributed (iid) mines in that batch. The
probability of kill for a simulation run is the average of 50 batches. With this large
number of trials in hand, the Central Limit Theorem says that the simulation-produced
Pk's are approximately normally distributed about the true Pk. The 95% confidence
interval (CI) is then:
a
2V N (26)
N = Number of trials
za ,
= 1 .96 (for a 95% Confidence Interval)
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The true Pk can be found analytically regardless ofPkmunition as long as the edges
ofthe munitions do not overlap. When the degradation caused by the edges ofthe circles
leaving the area of interest is ignored, the "true" PA; is a ratio of areas. The effect of the
decision to ignore the degradation caused by the edge effects will result in an analytical Pk
that is always slightly larger than the simulation result.
4
nh. _ -^munitions ryL.
A mun"'°" (27)
If approximately 95% of the confidence intervals calculated using equation (26)
contain the Pk calculated using equation (27), the simulation can not be rejected. As
shown in the graph and examples below, the simulation does not fail this test.




2. Solution 6: Analytical vs. Simulated
Conditions: Pkmunitlon = 1.0, RoverD = .5.
Analytical Solution:
Pktotai > .9069 {Pkmunition) = .9069
Simulated Result:
Row 1 {RoverD =
.5), Column six (Pkmuflltlo„ = 1.0), of Table (2) = .9032.
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The effects ofthe edges on the simulation results in a Pktotai that is slightly lower
than the analytical result. However, the 95% CI ofthe simulation result (.8937, .9127)
does contain the analytical solution. Figures (6) and (7) show the relationship between
many analytical results and independently generated simulation results.
c E p = 0. R evarO 5
(edges of circlet Just touch.ng)
Simulated Results vi Ana lytic el Reiultt
E rror Bare represent the 95% Confidence Interval for a run of SO 00
at each Pk(m unltlon)
Red Line connects analytical eolutions
5 6
Figure 7: 95% Confidence Interval For AH PkmunUwn^
0.7
CEP = 0, RoverD = .6
(edges of circles just touching)
Simulated Results vs. Analytical Results
Error Bars represent the 96% Confidence Interval
6000 samples per trial
Pk(munltlon)=.7




Figure 8: 95% Confidence Intervals for Ten Trials of Pkmumtwn = .7
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3. Analytical Verification Conclusion
Little disparity exits between Photos found using either method. Based on these
results, there seems to be no reason to reject the simulation, particularly in the case where
the CEP = 0.
B. CONFETI APPROXIMATION VERIFICATION
The Confetti Approximation is another useful indicator of simulation accuracy.
As discussed in Chapter II, Section C, this method of approximating the probability of kill
within area A treats each munition as if it has been cut into many small pieces of
"confetti". Each ofthese pieces of confetti is then independently and uniformly 'thrown"
onto A. One important difference between this situation and the previous one is that now
the disks which are to be cut up into confetti do not always have a Pk of 1 .0. This problem
is solved by multiplying the Amunmon by Pkmuniti0n, thus converting the disk into a smaller
one which does have a PA: of 1 .0. For munitions,
Pk
confetti
=^~ e ' (29)
Given any specific set of munition characteristics, the simulation generates M, the
number of munitions required to achieve the desired Pktouti. For a given Pktotai, an increase
in CEP results in an increase in M. Once M is known, and having already been given A totau
the Confetti Approximation formula will produce an estimated Pktotaj.
When CEP is low, we expect the Confetti Approximation to underestimate the
Pktotai. This underestimation is caused by the assumption that the pieces of confetti are
randomly placed in A. This results in unwanted overlap, decreasing efficiency, and
40
reducing Pkmai- As CEP increases, however, the placement of the munitions within A
more closely resembles the uniform distribution assumption ofthe Confetti
Approximation, and the two Pkmai^ start to converge. Finally, as CEP continues to grow,
some of the simulated munitions leave the intended area ,4. Because ofthe Confetti
Approximation assumption that all ofthe pieces of confetti remain within A, the Confetti
Approximation Pktotai is greater than the simulated Pktotai.
Figures (8) and (9) show the results for scenarios involving Pkmuniti nS of .5 and
.9, obtained through uniform impactor placement. As a reminder, 935 impactors uniformly
distributed to obtain Petal's of .5 and .9 against a mine of radius .5 feet results in
munitions with radii of 18.37 and 10.08 feet, respectively.
As expected, as CEP increases, the Confetti Approximation eventually
overestimates the true Pktotai- The relationship between the simulated Pktotai and the
-P&confetti_/ota/ is as it should be. These results provide no compelling reason to question the
accuracy of the simulation output. When combined with the accuracy displayed by the
simulation in the case where an analytical solution to the true Pktota\ was possible, it is
reasonable to assume that the simulation estimates an accurate Pktotai.
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CEP TotalMunitions SimPktot Confetti Pktot
0.00 187.69 0.9000 0.8221
3.00 194.35 0.9000 0.8327
6.00 200.05 0.9000 0.8413
9.00 215.25 0.9000 0.8620
12.00 227.72 0.9000 0.8769
15.00 233.15 0.9000 0.8829
18.00 243.22 0.9000 0.8933
21.00 250.73 0.9000 0.9004
24.00 256.05 0.9000 0.9052
Table 3. Confetti Approx. vs. Simulation Results: PkmunMon ~ -50, Pktotai = -90
CEP Total Munitions SimPkTot Confetti PkTot
0.00 375.7000 0.9900 0.9685
3.00 395.3800 0.9900 0.9737
6.00 409.7100 0.9900 0.9769
9.00 436.6100 0.9900 0.9820
12.00 474.1100 0.9900 0.9872
15.00 483.9200 0.9900 0.9883
18.00 495.1400 0.9900 0.9895
21.00 503.8300 0.9900 0.9903
24.00 519.5900 0.9900 0.9916
Table 4. Confetti Approx. vs. Simulation Results: Pkmumiion = .50, Pktotai = -99






















Figure 9: Confetti Approximation vs. Simulation Results at PkmutMon ~ «5
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Table 5.
CEP Total Muntions SimPkTot Confetti PkTot
0.00 197.58 0.9000 0.6269
3.00 254.43 0.9000 0.7190
6.00 389.24 0.9000 0.8566
9.00 400.30 0.9000 0.8643
12.00 421.22 0.9000 0.8777
15.00 468.21 0.9000 0.9033
18.00 481.59 0.9000 0.9095
21.00 496.29 0.9000 0.9159
24.00 500.75 0.9000 0.9178
Confetti Approx. vs. Simulation Results: Pkmumtion = -90, Pktotal = .90
CEP Total Munitions Sim PkTot Confetti PkTot
0.00 487.9500 0.9900 0.9124
3.00 520.7600 0.9900 0.9256
6.00 784.7600 0.9900 0.9801
9.00 865.8900 0.9900 0.9867
12.00 902.6000 0.9900 0.9889
15.00 977.7300 0.9900 0.9924
18.00 978.0600 0.9900 0.9924
21.00 1028.8000 0.9900 0.9941
24.00 1215.8100 0.9900 0.9977
Table 6. Confetti Approx. vs. Simulation Results: PkmunMon = ^90, Pktotai = -99
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Figure 10: Confetti Approximation vs. Simulation Results at Pkmunition = .90
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IV. ANALYSIS
Given that the simulation results are reasonable, it is possible to determine the
number of sorties required to clear area A under any number of conditions. Although it is
possible to do so, the many combinations of independent variables makes it unreasonable
to examine every possible case.
The variables are: (1) N - number of impactors per munition, (2) M- number of
munitions per Hydra-7
, (3) S - number ofHydra-7's per sortie, (4) Rmine - the minimum
mine radius which must be cleared to specifications, (5) A totai - the size of the area to be
cleared, and (6) CEP - circular error probable, the distance from the point ofaim within
which 50% ofthe munitions will land on average.
Output graphs provide information for any combination of the following:
(1) Dmunttion - The distribution pattern of impactors within the munition footprint,
(2) Pktotai - the level of clearance required, and (3) Pkmunition - The probability that a mine
ofradius Rmine located within the area covered by a single munition is killed.
Analysis will be conducted on the impact on total sortie requirement ofupper and
lower values of each variable, with all other variables held constant. Although the effects
ofchanges to combinations of variables will not be observed, the sensitivity of total sortie
requirements to each independent variable will be. This sensitivity analysis will provide
information on the variables which are most important to the future ofthe Hydra-7.
45
A. BASE CONDITIONS METHODOLOGY
An important first step in this sensitivity analysis is establishment of a starting
point, or a set of baseline conditions. Results produced from variations to the base
conditions are then compared to the base condition results to see the impact of
the changes.
1. Base Conditions:
TV (impactors per munition)= 935. This is the maximum number of impactors that,
when perfectly packed, can be placed in one munition;M (munitions per Hydra-7) = 7; S
(Hydra-7's per sortie) = 10; Rmine = .5 ft; Ama\ = 57600 ft2 (the size of the ICLS);
CEP = 3 feet. A graph ofthe results, shown below, provides solutions for any
combination ofPktotaU Pkmumnon, and impactor distribution
2. Base Case Results
The munition with the perfectly placed impactors is much more efficient than the
uniformly distributed one. In Figures (10) and (11), the same scale is maintained to allow
better visual comprehension ofthe difference between the two. Also, on both graphs, a
significant bend, or knee, occurs in the curve at Pktotai ~ 99. In the case ofthe uniformly
distributed impactors, the number of sorties required to go from a 99% clearance level to a
100% clearance level nearly doubles regardless of the Pkmuniti0„.
It is important to remember that these results are for a single simulation. Although
each simulation consists of thousands of iterations, it is inaccurate to report the results as
perfectly accurate. Statistically, it is impossible to achieve a 100% clearance level, which
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would require 100% clearance every time, in an infinite number of simulation runs. It is
possible, however, to achieve 100% clearance in any one of the simulation runs.
On both graphs, all values are bounded by Pkmuniti0n = .5 and Pkmumtion = 1.0,
however their positions are opposite on the two graphs. For the perfect distribution,
Pkmumtion = 1.0 is best, and Pkmu„inon =.5 is the worst. For the uniform distribution,
Pkmumtion = .5 is best, and Pkmunmon = 1.0 is worst.
3. Base Case Conclusions
If the impactor distribution is uniform, larger munitions with lower Pkmunition are
more efficient. Also, it appears that Pktotah of greater than .99 are going to be very hard to
get when the target is a 6-inch radius mine.
B. CEP SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The sensitivity of the model to changes in CEP requires investigation: As stated
previously, estimates ofCEP as the result ofGPS error are as large as 8 meters. For the
purposes of this study, this will be used as the upper bound on CEP error.
1. Conditions
Changes to CEP alone will be compared to the base case conditions. CEP is
increased to the upper limit of analysis.
Input Parameters: N = 935 (impactors per munition), M= 1 (munitions per
Hydra-7), 5 = 10 (Hydra-7's per sortie), Rmme = .5 ft; A totai = 57600 ft2 , CEP = 24feet.
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Figure 11: Base Conditions for Perfect Dmunition
Uniform Impactor Distribution
CEP=3, N=935, M=7, S=10, A=57,600 sqft, R(mine)=.5ft
Figure 12: Base Conditions for Uniform DmumOon
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2. Analysis
Figures (13) and (14) show the results of a dramatic increase in CEP. In the case
of the uniformly distributed impactors, it is clear that a larger, less efficient munition is the
best design. This provides an interesting insight, and is explained by the dampening effect
that larger munitions have on CEP. A closer look at Figure (13) reveals that with a larger
munition CEP, the relative effectiveness of Pkmunition = 1 and Pkmumtion = .5 have changed.
In other words, .5 is now the best, and 1 is now the worst.
Final analysis of the overall impact of CEP is best shown in a graph of the effect
of incremental increases in CEP on a single munition design over a range of Pktotais. For
illustrative purposes only, a weapon with a Pkmunillon of .7 will be used. Figure (15) shows
the results. Surprisingly, Figures (13) and (14) indicate that the number of required sorties
has a high level of tolerance to significant increases in CEP. Figure (15) more clearly
shows that the price of demanding Pktota i greater than .99 is very high.
3. Conclusion:
As expected, CEP is an important variable, the final value of which requires more
research and testing. However, for the representative case of Pk!otai of .95, a 700% increase
in CEP over the base case caused less than a 50% increase in sortie requirement. For Pktota i
values less than .98, CEP values as high as 24 feet failed to raise the number of sorties
above 10. While the impact is somewhat greater for larger Pktota{$>, this model indicates a
high level of robustness in the weapon. Thus, it appears that Hydra-7 will remain a viable
weapon for CEP values over a broad range of dispersion errors.
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It is likely that the final impactor distribution pattern will resemble the uniform
distribution, rather than the perfect one. For that reason , the remainder ofthis paper will










CEP = 24ft, N=935, M = 7, S = 1 0, A=57,600 sqft,
R(mine)=.5ft
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Pk(total)
Figure 13: Effect of Increased CEP on Perfect Distribution
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Uniform Impactor D istnbution
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Pk (total)
0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
Figure 14: Effect of Increased CEP on Uniform Distribution
Effect of Increases in CEP
Pk(munition) = .7
CEP
Figure 15: Effect of Increased CEP on Pkmunition - .7
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4. Why /^totai Increases With RnmtMon
The conclusion reached above, that when CEP is large, a munition footprint with
a larger radius and a lower probability of kill is more efficient than one with a smaller
radius and a larger probability of kill, is not an intuitive one. However, the visual
representation shown below will be helpful.
Intuitively, the reason that the Pktotai in Figure (16) is smallest is because the
amount ofuncovered area is largest. Also, as Pktotai approaches 1.0, the positive effect of
munition overlap on Pktotai is negated. For the range of parameters examined in this study,
and when Dmun iti0n is uniform, the largest RmUmtion produced the largest Pktotai with the
fewest number of sorties. Figures (16) through (19) show circular munitions placed with
the same CEP, or circular error probable, but in each figure Rmunmon is increased. Even
though the circles in Figure (19) have a lower Pkmuniti n than the circles in Figure (16), the
Pktotai for the area shown in Figure (19) is higher.
Figure 16: PkmunMon = -998, Pktotai w .65
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Figure 17: Pk„miaio„ = .96, Pkmai « .88
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Figure 19: Pontoon = -63, PA:torfl/ « .99
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C. IMPACTORS PER MUNITION SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Current Lockheed Martin estimates are that the munition body has the ability to
hold 935 impactors. However, it is likely that this is an optimistic estimate. The dispenser
will require some space, therefore reducing the space available for impactors. Therefore,
the system's sensitivity to decreases in the number of impactors per munition must
be investigated.
1. Conditions
Input Parameters: N = 500 (impactors per munition), M=l (munitions per
Hydra-7), 5=10 (Hydra-7's per sortie), Rmine = .5 ft; A tota, = 57600 ft2 , CEP = 3 ft.
2. Analysis
Fewer impactors means a smaller radius for a given Pkmmition, and consequently an
increase in sorties. When compared to Figure (11), Figure (20) summarizes the impact that
a reduction in N from 935 to 500 has on all of uniformly built munition designs.
Figure (21) shows the effect of incremental reductions inN for Pkmunition = -7.
3. Conclusions
The number of sorties required to achieve a specified Pktotai is approximately
inversely proportional to the number of impactors per munition. So, halving N nearly
doubles the required number of sorties. As an example, Figure (20) shows that for a Pktotai
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Figure 20: Effect of Impactors per Munition on Uniform Distribution
A reduction in the number of impactors per munition from the base case of 950 to 500
results in an increase in the number of sorties.




Figure 21: Effect of Impactors per Munition on Pkmumtion - -7
The effect of variations in the number of impactors per munition for a single munition
design.
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D. MINE SIZE (Rmine) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Of all of the parameters examined in this sensitivity analysis phase, probably none
is as important as Rmine- Although N and CEP are important factors in determining sortie
requirements, their final values will be determined by engineering constraints, and an
optimal solution can be analytically detennined. On the other hand, the size of the mine
that needs to be cleared is open to debate. Some commanders will believe that A should
be cleared to level Pktotai of all mines, regardless of size. Others argue that only anti-tank
mines, which generally are larger than their anti-personnel counterparts, need to be cleared
by Hydra-7.
A good solution is to make the Hydra-7 flexible enough to handle changing
threats. Ifthe engineers can build the dispenser to allow selection ofRmunuton, then the
munition can be "dialed in" to achieve any Pkmunitio„ on any Rmine . However, this is
unlikely. A more likely scenario is that the munition will be designed and built using
today's best guess at what the future will look like. So, careful consideration ofthe
appropriate Rmine is required.
1. Conditions
Input Parameters: N =935 (impactors per munition), M=l (munitions per
Hydra-7), S = 10 (Hydra-7's per sortie),R^
=.25ft, A tota] = 57600 ft
2
, CEP = 3 ft.
2. Analysis
When compared to Figure (12), Figure (22) shows the effect ofchanging Rmine
from six inches to three inches. In this case, a 50% reduction in the variable Rmine results in
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a very large increase in the number of sorties. Figure (23) is a representative example of
this relationship.
3. Conclusions
On Figure (23), the bend in the knees of the curves for Pkmunitwn = .7 just prior to
Rmine = four inches indicates that any Rmne under four inches starts to become very
expensive in terms of sorties. More generally, the relationship between Rmine and sorties
appears to be:
1
# sorties °= —-—
.
(27)
So, if Rmine is halved, the number of sorties quadruples. For example, the curve
representing Pk,ota i = .95 shows that when Rmme = 6 inches, approximately six sorties are
required. But, at Rmine =three inches, the number of sorties quadruples to 24. While this
relationship holds across the range of values shown in Figure (23), it is also reasonably
accurate between Figure (23) and Figure (12), the base case.
For Pkmumtwn = .50 and Pktota i = -95, Figure (12), with the base case of Rmine = 6
inches, shows a requirement for just under four sorties. In Figure (21), where Rmine = 3
inches, over 16 sorties are required. Again, halving Rmme quadrupled the sortie
requirement. This generalization should also prove useful during the remaining design
phase. It may also prove useful in procurement decisions.
Based of the results of this research, the Hydra-7 does not appear to be efficient in
killing small mines. If there is a requirement to clear the ICLS of small mines, the
Hydra-7 may not be the weapon for the job.
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Uniform Impactor Distribution
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Figure 22: Effect of Decreased Rmine on Uniform Distribution
A change in Rmine to 3 inches. Note that the scale ofthe y axis has been changed from the
base case graph (Fig(l 1)) to account for the large increase in sorties.
Sorties as a function of R(mine)
P(munition) = .7
4 5 6 7 8
R(mine) inches
Figure 23: Effect of Decreased Rmine on PkmunMon = -7
A graph of the relationship between Rmme and the number of sorties required to clear to a
specified Pktotai-
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E. OPTIMAL MUNITION DESIGN
It has been shown in the discussion ofFigures (16) through (19) that, in the case
of a munition with uniformly distributed impactors, a larger RmUmtion is more efficient than
a smaller one.
A munition designed to kill Rminejnitiai at level Pkmunjti0„ will kill 7?m;we
_
new to level
jKmunitionjnev/' At ^mine_ncv/ IS leSS 111311 KmlneJnitiah * ^munition new Will De 1CSS Uian r ktnunitiorii
resulting in an Rmunition that is larger than it would have been had the munition originally
been designed to kill Rmj„e_„ew to level Pkmunition .
Therefore, although a decrease in Rmine will result in an increase in the number of
sorties required, if the initial munition is designed as large as possible, the impact of
reductions in Rmunition will be minimized.
This does not mean that the final number of sorties required to kill Rmine_new will
not be too high. What it does mean, however, is that the munitions should be as large as
possible, as long as Rmunmon does not exceed the length ofthe shortest side ofA. This is
unlikely, however, as impactors must maintain very high velocity to work properly. An
impactor that strays too far from the center ofRmuniti0n is unlikely to maintain the
required speed.
Also of interest, ifthe munitions are large, where Rmunition approaches the length of
any side ofA, it is very likely that some aiming point pattern other than the one used here
would be most efficient. Under the current pattern, as the munitions grow, an increasing
number of impactors will be lost out the sides ofA. Intuitively, as Rmunition increases, the
optimal aiming points will tend towards the center. At the point that the diameter of the
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munition is equal to the length of the sides of A, the aiming point of all munitions would
be the center of A.
Given a final munition design with a characteristic Pkmuni ,i0n and Rmunition against a
base case Rm ine , the Pkmuni,i0n
_
new for that munition against Rmine_new can be found. It is not











new is known, the distance between munition centers, d, can be
found from the simulation output tables. Subsequently, munition aiming points can be
found. See Figure (6).
F. OTHER VARIABLE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Although the Excel spreadsheet with which sensitivity analysis is being conducted
does have the option of changing the number of munitions per Hydra-7 (M), the number of
Hydra-7's per sorties (S), and the size of the target area (A) to see the effect on the sortie
requirement, the results are unsurprising, and will therefore only be briefly addressed.
Increasing the size ofA will increase the requirement for munitions, independent of other
variables, and will do so uniformly across the range of Pkmun iti n s and Pk,OIaiS. Likewise,
an change in the number of munitions per system, or in the number of systems that can fit
on any aircraft, will result in a corresponding change in the number of sorties.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In the base case, the number of sorties required to clear the ICLS (240ft by 240ft)
of between 95% and 98% of six-inch mines is between four and five. Base Case
conditions are 935 impactors per munition, 7 munitions per Hydra-7, 10 Hydra-7's per
sortie, and a uniform impactor distribution in the munition footprint.
If the number of impactors per munition is reduced to 500, the sortie requirement
to clear the ICLS of between 95% and 98% of six-inch mines is between seven and ten.
The sortie requirement is inversely proportional to the number of impactors per munition.
If the CEP is increased to 24 feet from the base case value of three feet, the sortie
requirement to clear the ICLS of between 95% and 98% of six-inch mines is between five
and ten.
If the radius of the mine which needs to be cleared to level Pktota\ is reduced to
three inches from the base case value of six inches, the sortie requirement to clear the
ICLS of between 95% and 98% of six inch mines is between 15 and 25 sorties. Halving of
Rmine approximately quadruples the sortie requirement.
Bigger munitions are better. Munitions built to maximize Rmunition are much more
efficient than munitions built to maximize PkmUmtion, especially when impactors are
assumed to be uniformly distributed.
Rmine is the most important "enemy controlled" variable when determining sortie
requirements.
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With the possible exception of an Rmj„e of less than 4 inches, a properly designed,
the Hydra-7 Counter-Mine Weapon System appears to possess a high level of robustness
to fluctuations in the variables addressed here.
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